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admission processes. The effect of this holding can only be hypothesized in light of the
prestige of the District Court of the Southern District of New York and the soundness
of the court's reasoning. Although the court refused to shift the burden of proof from
the applicant to the bar on the question of worthiness, it did severely limit the means
used to elicit such proof. This case heralds the application in New York, and predictably in other states with similar procedures, of the first amendment protections to
those who wish to practice law.
Refusal to invalidate the statutes involved here is a judicial affirmance of the need
for continued careful scrutiny of prospective attorneys. Rather than shifting the burden
of proof from the applicant, the court here preferred to more closely supervise the
methods used by the bar for determining whether this burden has been met. The
general effect of this case will be to make bar procedures less susceptible to arbitrariness and discrimination. It will not, however, significantly alter the right of state bars
to require high standards of character and to require proof of this by the applicant.
The claimed "chilling effect" which the statutory requirement itself may produce in
the law student should be warmed by this court's policing of admission techniques.

Alice in Wunderlich: The Attorney General's Dream of
Limiting the GAO's Claim Settlement Authority
The present controversy over the authority of the General Accounting Office (GAO)
to review contract appeals board decisions arose out of a contract between the Air
Force and Southside Plumbing Company, Inc. The contract contained the standard
"disputes clause" which provides that if a dispute arises under the contract, the contractor can request a decision by the contracting officer. 1 This decision is final unless
appealed within 30 days to the department head or his duly authorized representative
-in the instant case, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).2 The
decision of the appeals board on questions of fact is "final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or
arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by
3
substantial evidence."
Southside claimed additional compensation for work which it asserted was outside
the scope of the contract and therefore not covered by the basic price. Both the contracting officer and the ASBCA denied the claim. 4 Rather than appealing to the
1. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1968). The contracting officer is the person who executes
the contract on behalf of the government. Id. § 7.103-1 (b).
2. Id. § 30.1 (1968).
3. Id. § 7.103-12 (1968).
4. Southside Plumbing Co., 1963 GOVT CONT. REP. 1 3982 (ASBCA); 1964 Gov'T
CONT. REP. 4314 (ASBCA).
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Court of Claims, 5 Southside submitted its claim to the GAO. The GAO accepted
the ASBCA decision on questions of fact, but held that since the contract specifications were ambiguous, and since the contractor had requested but did not receive
clarification, the ambiguity should, as a matter of law, be construed against the
government. 6 The GAO requested that the Air Force return the case to the ASBCA
for a determination of the amount due the contractor as an equitable adjustment.
The Air Force, claiming the GAO had no authority to review ASBCA decisions,
refused to comply with the directive, and submitted the matter to the Department of
Justice.
On January 16, 1969, Attorney General Ramsey Clark issued a formal opinion7
advising the Air Force that it was not legally required to comply with the GAO request. The Attorney General added that the Air Force should not comply-even as a
matter of comity-since GAO procedures fall short of due process requirements.
Compliance, argued the Attorney General, would also deprive the government of
judicial review in light of the current policy against government appeal of adverse
administrative decisions. He pointed out, however, that noncompliance would not
foreclose appeal by the aggrieved contractor.
The GAO thereafter informed the Justice Department 8 that it would continue to
review contract appeals board decisions presented to it, including those denying
relief to the contractor, pursuant to its broad statutory mandate to settle and adjust
"[a]ll claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or
against it .

...-

9

This controversy presents issues vital to the efficient functioning of administrative
agencies. What authority does GAO possess to bind executive agencies by its review
of contract appeals board decisions? Does that authority depend upon whether the
board ruling is adverse to the government? Is it desirable for the government to
assert its right to judicial review of adverse administrative decisions? If so, who is
best suited to determine whether further litigation is warranted? When is an administrative agency, acting within its delegated powers, bound by an opinion of the Attorney General which limits the exercise of those powers?
The GAO's Authority to Review Contract Appeals Board Decisions
The GAO claims authority to review contract appeals board decisions and to
settle by its own determination any question which would be open to a court under
5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964): "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded ... upon any
express or implied contract with the United States. . . " If the amount of the contractor's claim was less than $10,000, he might alternatively have brought suit in a district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1964): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of ... (2) Any . . .civil action or claim
against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded . . .upon . . .any

"
express or implied contract with the United States ....
6. Southside Plumbing Co., GAO: B-156192, Dec. 8, 1966.
Op.
7. Letter from Attorney General Clark to the Secretary of the Air Force, ......
, (Jan. 16, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Attorney General Clark's letter].
ATT'Y GEN .......
8. Letter from Comptroller General Staats to Attorney General Mitchell, Feb. 7, 1969.
9. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, § 305, 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964).
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the disputes clause. In a brief submitted to the Attorney General, 10 the GAO provided
an extensive list of cases indicating the long and widespread recognition by some
agencies of the GAO's jurisdiction in the disputes area. The brief cited GAO reversals of board decisions both denying and granting relief to contractors, and noted
that this was the first dispute in which an agency has refused to abide by a GAO
reversal of a board ruling.
The GAO's authority to review board decisions is based primarily on the two
statutes from which the GAO derives its claims settlement authority. 11 The Budget
and Accounting Act of 192112 created the GAO as an independent agency to replace
the office of the Comptroller of the Treasury and vested in it authority to examine
and audit the financial transactions of government agencies. 13 The Act provides that
"[a]ll claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or
against it, and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the United States
is concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General
Accounting Office."' 4 Determinations made by the GAO in settling accounts are final
as against the executive branch, but executive officials are authorized to apply to the
Comptroller General for rulings in advance of the settlement of their accounts.13
The GAO brief emphasized the comprehensiveness of the statutory language 16 and
the lengthy history of its broad claims settlement function.1 7 The GAO also justifies
its authority to review board decisions as "a necessary corollary of the basic settlement
and audit authority granted by the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as well as the
claims settlement authority."' 8 In an opinion which was handed down two days
before its Southside decision, the GAO stated:
[I]t is well established that the legal propriety of payments made by public
officers in the transaction of the Government's business is subject to de10. Brief on the Jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office in Contract Disputes
with Special Reference to B-156192 the Southside case, Dec. 8, 1966, GAO: B-156192,
Dec. 11, 1967, at 5-6 [hereinafter cited as Brief].
11. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, § 305, 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964); Dockery Act

of 1894 § 8, 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964).
12. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
13. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, §§ 302, 304, 31 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44 (1964). See
generally THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNT-

ING OFFICE, S. Doe. No. 96, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; HOUSE COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A STUDY
OF ITS FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1441, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).

14. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, § 305, 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964). For a
thorough discussion of the current practices of the GAO under this broad claims settlement authority, see Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad
Power to Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 350 (1956).
15. Dockery Act of 1894, § 8, 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964). See also 31 U.S.C. § 82d
(1964), which grants to certifying officers the same right to obtain a decision on any
question of law involved either in a payment or in vouchers presented to them.
16. See 4 CoMP. GEN. 404, 405 (1924).
17. Brief, supra note 10, at 2-5. For an excellent discussion of both the history of the
GAO's claims settlement jurisdiction and finality of its settlements concerning executive
agencies see Lambert Lumber Co. v. Jones Eng'r & Constr. Co., 47 F.2d 74 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 842 (1931).
18. Brief, supra note 10, at 5.
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termination by the General Accounting Office and that such payments are
not final until settled by the General Accounting Office . . . .Accordingly,
in transactions involving an expenditure of public funds we have regularly
reviewed the conditions underlying any payment made pursuant to a contractual agreement and ... we have taken whatever action was necessary to
recover any amounts improperly paid . . . . Conversely, a contractor who
feels that he is entitled to an additional amount under a contract may present
a claim to the General Accounting Office for settlement, regardless of the
administrative action taken in the matter. . . . [W]e have always reviewed,
and sometimes questioned, administrative decisions under the standard
"Disputes" clause on the basis of the standards prescribed in the Wunderlich Act. 41 U.S.C. [§§] 321, 322 [(1964)]. We believe that our jurisdiction to
review Disputes clause decisions on such [a] basis ... is clearly conferred
by the basic settlement and audit authority granted by the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921. . . .[O]ur claims determinations thereunder ...are
19
binding upon the executive agencies.
The Attorney General summarily dismissed this argument, noting that nothing in
the cited authorities specifically "provides for remanding a claim to an Executive
20
agency for fact-finding. Nor does any other statute authorize such a remand." The
21
and
GAO had cited by analogy United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc.
22
Both
this
procedure.
for
basis
as
a
States
United
Co.
v.
Electric
Robertson
cases held that the Court of Claims could suspend proceedings and remand a case
to the ASBCA for determination of factual issues. In the former case, however, the
Supreme Court carefully refused to state whether the ASBCA was bound to make the
prescribed determination, 23 and, in the latter case, the court totally avoided the
issue. The Attorney General observed that by this argument the GAO has only a
right to request review, not to demand it.24
Beyond this conclusion, the Attorney General's opinion fails to rebut the GAO's
asserted jurisdiction. The Attorney General was required to state only whether the
Air Force must obey the GAO directive as a matter of law. Therefore the rest of the
opinion concerning whether the Air Force should comply with the directive as a
matter of comity was dicta.
Due Process and the Wunderlich Act
Couched in the Attorney General's opinion was the implication that GAO procedures fall short of due process requirements. The Attorney General emphasized
19. S & E Contractors, Inc., 46 CoMp. GEN. 441, 453-54 (1966). Accord, Marr v.
United States, 106 F. Supp. 204 (Ct. Cl. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 956 (1953);
C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
20. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7,at 7.
21. 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
22. 176 Ct. Cl. 1287 (1966).
23. United States v.Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1966). The
court merely pointed out that the threat of reversal of the board ruling by the Court of
Claims would be an effective means of forcing compliance by the board.
24. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 7-8.
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that the history of government contract disputes settlement indicates a shift in final
decision-making power from the GAO to the courts. He noted that, although originally all such claims were committed to the ultimate discretion of the Comptroller
of the Treasury, since the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855,25 increasingly
effective judicial remedies have been provided for such claims. This trend toward
ensuring due process in the disputes procedure culminated in the recent development
of an elaborate system within the contracting agencies for resolving contract disputes
through adversary proceedings subject to judicial review. 26 The effect of this trend
has been "for the Government to step down from its sovereign role and submit to the
same legal and judicial processes which determine the contract rights and obligations
27
of private citizens."
Partly because of the movement to assure limited judicial review of contract appeals
board decisions Congress, in 1954, passed the Wunderlich Act.28 The immediate
motivation for its passage was the desire to nullify two Supreme Court decisions:
United States v. Moorman29 and United States v. Wunderlich.30 These cases virtually
eliminated the jurisdiction of courts and of the GAO to review contract appeals
board decisions rendered pursuant to increasingly used "finality clauses." These
clauses specified that all disputes, whether of fact or law, would be conclusively
settled within the agency. The Wunderlich Act, the terms of which are embodied in
the "disputes clause" now in use, provides that such decisions are not final on ques25. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-58
(1962) for the history behind the creation of the Court of Claims. "The Court of
Claims was created . . . primarily to relieve the pressure on Congress caused by the
volume of private bills." Id. at 552. Although the court was created in 1855, its
judgments were not final prior to 1863. Id. at 553-54.
26. For a brief discussion of the movement toward due process in government contract dispute procedures, see Spector, Is It "Bianchi's Ghost"-Or "Much Ado About
Nothing"? 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 87, 97-102 (1964). See also vom Baur, Remedies
of Contractors with the Government, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 469, 495 (1967). The
ASBCA has been particularly commended for its fair and expeditious procedures. Leventhal, Public Contracts and Administrative Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 35, 39 (1966). For a discussion of the weaknesses remaining in the current procedures, see Frana, Are There
Too Many Boards of Contract Appeals? 17 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 44, 56-58 (1967).
27. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 9.
28. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
29. 338 U.S. 457 (1950). The Court held that a disputes clause declaring that an
administrative decision would be conclusive upon the parties was valid and enforceable,
preventing judicial review on questions of law.
30. 342 U.S. 98 (1951). Prior to the Wunderlich decision, the courts had been asserting
"arbitrariness, ....
capriciousness," "gross error implying bad faith," and "fraud" as
grounds for reviewing final administrative decisions on questions of fact. The Court of
Claims had confined the GAO to the fraud and gross error standards. See Schultz,
Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle
Over the Wunderlich Case, 67 HARV. L. REV. 217 (1953). In Wunderlich the Court
rejected these grounds, on the basis of the contractor's contractual waiver of further
appeal to the courts from an adverse agency decision. Reverting to the basic principle of
public contract law laid down in Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878), the
Court narrowed the scope of review to a single ground-allegation and proof of actual
fraud, which it defined as "conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest .... If the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter
for Congress." United States v. Wunderlich, supra at 100.
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tions of fact if "fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as
3
necessarily to imply bad faith, or . . . not supported by substantial evidence." ' It
further provides that "[n]o Government contract shall contain a provision making final
on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or
32
board."
The Attorney General's opinion noted that the House Report accompanying the
Wunderlich Act stated that the primary objective of the Act in making available this
limited judicial review of board decisions was "to require each party [in an administrative hearing] to present openly its side of the controversy and afford an opportunity
of rebuttal." 33 The Attorney General concluded that since the "GAO is not equipped
for the decision of legal controversies according to the procedures customary to
adversary proceedings," its ex parte reversal of a board decision as in the Southside
case would be contrary to the procedural requirements for due process intended by
34
the Act.
The portion of the House Report quoted by the Attorney General, however, is
taken out of context.3 5 Franklin Schultz, former Chairman of the Agency Adjudication Committee of the American Bar Association, has stated that:
a fair reading of the congressional testimony [on the Wunderlich Act] reveals
that administrative due process was not a central issue before Congress.
The congressmen who considered the proposed legislation were mainly concerned with restoring the pre-Wunderlich standards of review so as to provide
a genuine escape from possible arbitrariness and capriciousness on the
part of the government officers entrusted with the ultimate authority to
decide disputes ....
[Furthermore] the hearings do not reflect any significant
concern with the Court of Claims' procedure for hearing and deciding cases
brought by contractors who had been unsuccessful before the departmental
boards .... 36
The Attorney General also noted the Act's failure to state which forum or forums
may review contract appeals board decisions in accordance with its standards. The
failure to specifically mention the GAO in the Act is construed by the Attorney
General to be evidence that Congress intended review be granted only to the courts.

31. 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
32. Id. § 322.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
34. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 15 n.15. In a disputes clause
case, the Comptroller General bases his decision upon the written file provided by the
agency and any written arguments submitted by the claimant. There are no oral
hearings before any board or official of the GAO; nor is there any facility for factfinding. As in Southside, no briefs or arguments from the contracting agency are
solicited. For a discussion of the GAO's claim procedure, see Welch, The General
Accounting Office in Government Procurement, 14 FED. B.J. 321 (1954).
35. The sentence from which the quotation was taken inexplicably followed a discussion justifying the inclusion in the Wunderlich Act of the substantial evidence rule for
the purpose of obtaining a more complete record in government contract disputes.
36. Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on judicial Review of Administrative
Determination of Government Contract Disputes, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 115, 118
(1964).
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The legislative history of the Act reveals that the bill first passed by the Senate
contained a provision, proposed by the GAO, which provided that such decisions
would not be final if found by "the General Accounting Office or a court, having
jurisdiction" 37 to be fraudulent, etc. Because the Department of Defense and various
defense industries objected that the GAO proposal could be interpreted to give a
GAO determination an effect equal to that of a court, the words were omitted from
the final bill.38 The GAO agreed to the omission because it was assured that specific mention of the GAO and the courts was unnecessary to confer the review
jurisdiction which they already possessed. 3 9 Accordingly, the House Report which
accompanied the final bill stated:
The proposed legislation, as amended, will not add to, narrow, restrict,
or change in any way the present jurisdiction of the General Accounting
Office either in the course of a settlement or upon audit .... It is intended
that the General Accounting Office, as was its practice . . . shall apply the
standards of review that are granted to the courts under this bill. At the
same time there is no intention of setting up the General Accounting Office
as a 'court of claims.' Nor should the elimination of the specific mention
of the General Accounting Office in the bill be construed as limiting its
review to the fraudulent intent standard prescribed by the Wunderlich
40
decision.
It is clear that the effect of the GAO's compromise was to forego any legislative
grant of authority, while remaining free to exercise any independent statutory authority it already had. The above quoted statement, however, gives no indication as
to what that independent authority was or should be, thus creating more confusion
than clarity. The statement that the GAO's jurisdiction is not increased is in conflict with the additional bases of jurisdiction to decide factual matters which the
Act confers, 4 1 unless this additional jurisdiction was conferred only upon the courts.
Yet the House Report expressly grants to the GAO the same standards of review
granted to the courts. Conversely, assuming the authority granted to the GAO was
to be commensurate with that of the courts, the statement that the GAO's scope of
review is broader than the intentional fraud standard of the Wunderlich decision
serves no purpose.
37. S. 2487, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952). See also S. REP. No. 1670, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952).
38. See Hearings on S. 2487 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, Finality Clauses in Government Contracts, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 91-93, 112-13 (1952).
The main objections to the GAO's applying the same standards as a court were that:
(1) it would destroy the finality of the existing, impartial agency procedure; (2) it
would unfairly subject contractors to a second and unbargained-for administrative review; and (3) use of the liberal substantial evidence rule by the GAO to reverse an
agency ruling on which the contractor relied would create chaos in the contractor's
banking and surety relationships.
39. Brief, supra note 10, at 8. See Hearings on H.R. 1839, S. 24, H.R. 3634, and
H.R. 6946 Before the House Comm. on the judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 36-42
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 1839].
40. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1954).
41. Certainly the substantial evidence test is more liberal than any previous standards
of review exercised by the GAO. See note 30 supra.
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The Justice Department resolves this confusion by concluding that under prior
statutory authority the GAO is confined to its audit and account settlement authority
conferred by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and that this authority is
limited to reviewing agency decisions against the government, as part of its duty to
control the manner in which public money is spent. 42 Under this approach a GAO
reversal of a decision in favor of the government pursuant to the auditing authority
would be ultra vires, for it would create a government obligation rather than exercise
auditing judgment upon an existing debt.
The GAO, on the other hand, asserts that the Budget and Accounting Act, in
authorizing it to settle all claims by, or against, the government, conferred upon it
the same standards of review which the courts had in settling claims involving public
funds. The GAO claims that it had utilized those same standards of arbitrariness,
capriciousness, etc., prior to the Moorman and Wunderlich decisions, and thus it
had a legal mandate to continue to do so. 43 The Court of Claims has consistently
recognized the GAO's authority under the Wunderlich Act to overturn disputes clause
decisions both for and against the government, at least as to questions of law. 44 In any
event, the GAO's interpretation of Southside's contract specifications indisputably in42. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 14, 17. The Attorney General
stated that
i]n the course of auditing and settling the accounts of . . . disbursing and
certifying officers, or in response to a request for an advance opinion as to the
allowability of a particular credit in their accounts, GAO is not required to
accept a disputes clause decision against the Government which it believes
GAO does not need to rely
would not be sustained if challenged in court ....
on the claim settlement authority of 31 U.S.C. 71 to disallow claims against the
Government. Where payment of a claim has already been approved by an
Executive agency, its disallowance by GAO is an incident of the account
settlement authority. In its function of auditing and settling accounts, or
advising what its audit decision would be, GAO may determine that a claim
should be disallowed without resort to its direct claim settlement authority.
Id. at 14, 17. The Attorney General apparently believed that the claim settlement
authority of 31 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74 is worthless as a distinct source of jurisdiction, at
least where government contract disputes are involved.
43. See quotation from letter of the Comptroller General in Hearings on H.R. 1839,
supra note 39, at 34-35.
44. See, e.g., C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 600, 608 (Ct.
Cl. 1965), where the court stated:
One of the major reasons for the passage of the [Wunderlich] Act was to assure
the General Accounting Office a limited right of scrutiny comparable to
(though perhaps not precisely the same as) that given to the courts.
Though his power to utilize all of the Wunderlich standards has been questioned by some, the Comptroller General has asserted, since the enactment
of the statute, the same authority as the courts to disallow payment of a
contractor's claims . . . . Where the issue is one of law (e.g., interpretation of
the contract), this court has upheld exercises of that power. . . . [Tihe
fact that [GAO] undoubtedly has some role under the Wunderlich Act helps
to demonstrate that the statute applies to administrative decisions favoring the
contractor, as well as those which are adverse. . . . Issues of law, at the very
least, are still open.
See also Associated Traders, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 502, 506 (Ct. CL.
1959) ; Northrop Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 597, 599-601 (Ct. Cl.
1955).
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volved a question of law, 45 and was therefore clearly within both the pre-Wunderlich
practices of the GAO and the express provisions of the Act.
Regardless of which of the conflicting interpretations of GAO's prior statutory
authority is correct, the Attorney General's conclusion that the legislative history of
the Wunderlich Act indicates, on balance, "that Congress did not intend to set GAO
up as an additional layer of administrative appeal for contractors on disputes clause
questions" 46 is not warranted. This conclusion is based on an inference that Congress
would prefer final settlement by an adversary judicial proceeding to a possibly final
GAO determination rendered in an administrative proceeding lacking in due process
requirements. Aside from the fact that the legislative history of the Wunderlich Act
offers, at best, meager evidence to support this conclusion, the inference is even more
questionable today in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Carlo Bianchi & Co.,4 7 limiting judicial review of contract disputes decisions to the
administrative record. Thus, the Court of Claims' practice of de novo hearings was
overruled; the court was cast in the role of an appellate court, with procedures more
closely approximating those of the GAO.
It must be concluded that the Attorney General's recommendation to the Air Force
that it should not comply with the GAO directive as a matter of comity cannot stand
on the basis of a legislative intent to exclude ex parte GAO proceedings from the
otherwise open and adversary process of government contract disputes settlement.
Moreover, if Congress had clearly indicated such an intention, then the Wunderlich Act would have been in derogation of the basic auditing and accounts settlement
authority granted to the GAO in 1921. As noted above, the Attorney General
concedes that this authority necessarily entitles the GAO to disallow claims against
the government. If the GAO's decision making procedures were declared illegal as
violative of due process, the GAO would thereby be denied all discretion to pass on
the propriety of payments certified by the executive agencies, as well as the discretion
it exercised in the Southside case in reviewing the propriety of a decision not to pay.
If the basic and long-standing role of the GAO as guardian of the public moneys is
to be limited to mere bookkeeping, such an intention must be indicated by Congress
in clear and unambiguous language.
It has been cogently argued 48 that the GAO's power to disallow expenditures
exerts a strong and disruptive influence upon the policies and programs of the executive agencies, that it denies the agencies the degree of discretion necessary to effective
action and that it unfairly subjects contractors to a second and unbargained-for re45. It is a well settled rule of public contracts that "[w]hen a decision concerning
the allowability of an equitable adjustment turns on the proper interpretation of
contract provisions, then what is ultimately involved is a question of law." Kaiser
Indus. Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 322, 334 (Ct. Cl. 1965). See, e.g., Kayfield
Constr. Corp. v. United States, 278 F.2d 217, 218 (2d Cir. 1960); C.J. Langenfelder
& Son, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 600, 609 (Ct. Cl. 1965). See also Shedd, Disputes
and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 39, 78-80 (1964).
46. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 13.

47. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
48. Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power to Settle
and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, supra note 14.
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view by an unrelated agency which they cannot second-guess. These practical criticisms
of the breadth of the GAO's claims settlement authority may have merit; but like the
due process argument, they are nonlegal approaches to a problem which must be
resolved legally, by Congress, if at all. The Attorney General recognized this limita' ' 49
The Attorney
tion when he introduced his due process attack in terms of "comity.
General's due process attack has failed to rebut GAO's asserted legal right, under its
broad statutory authority, to settle all claims by or against the government, to (a)
disallow a contract disputes claim approved by an agency, and (b) allow a claim
denied, by the agency, subject to the following limitations: (1) the Wunderlich Act
standards, which circumscribed the GAO's right to review, and (2) the contracting
agency's reluctance to perform any further fact-finding necessary before the GAO
reversal can be acted upon.
Judicial Review of GAO Action on ASBCA Decisions
The Attorney General agrees with the GAO that the Comptroller General may
disallow claims which boards have awarded to contractors as an incident of the GAO's
statutory duty to insure that government funds are expended according to the law.
The Attorney General contends, however, that this authority does not extend to the
allowance of a claim which a board has denied contractors. He distinguishes between
the two situations by their results: the GAO's allowance of a claim which the contract
appeals board denied would deprive the government of an opportunity for judicial
review of the board's decision, while a disallowance by the GAO of an item paid the
contractor would permit the contracting agency to set off the amount disallowed
against other sums due the contractor, ultimately forcing him to sue to recover the
withheld amount. If no offset is available, the contracting agency can refer the
matter to the Department of Justice, the government's counsel in claims litigation, for
50
suit to recover the erroneous payment from the contractor.
In the instant case, however, the ASBCA decided the Southside claim in favor of
the government so that no payment was certified thereunder for the GAO's approval.
It was Southside who submitted the claim to the GAO, probably to avoid the time
5
and expense of litigation in the Court of Claims. 1 The GAO decided to allow
Southside's unpaid claim, but because the amount of the equitable adjustment had not
yet been ascertained by the Board, it could not issue a warrant to the Treasury Department to pay the claim; nor could the GAO insist on redetermination of the case
by the ASBCA since the GAO was not a party to the contract under which the
right of appeal to the ASBCA was created.
The Attorney General stated that compliance would surrender the government's
rights "without the opportunity to defend before the Court of Claims .... "52 The
49. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 8.
50. It is well established that the government may recover funds wrongfully or
illegally paid by its agents. See, e.g., United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 (1938);
Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. United States, 164 U.S. 190 (1896); United States v.
Bentley, 107 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1939).
51. See Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power to
Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, supra note 14, at 355.
52. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 15.
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government clearly has the right to initiate judicial review to recover public funds
wrongfully or illegally paid, although thus far procedures for doing so have been
clandestine and not formalized.5 3 There is no reason why that right must be "surrendered" in a case such as this where the GAO has allowed a claim not paid by the
agency. Three possibiliies are open to the agency. First, it can pay the claim, and
then sue to recover the payment in the Court of Claims. The Attorney General admits
54
that such payment is not inconsistent with, or a bar to, appeal by the government.
The contracting agency, by certifying payment contrary to the board's decision, would
not be in breach of its contract with the contractor, since the disputes clause clearly
does not bind either party to the board's decision on questions of law. Second, if
there are other sums owing the contractor from the government, the agency can pay
the claim and then set off the amount paid against the sums due, ultimately forcing
the contractor to sue in the Court of Claims for the withheld amount. Thirdly, the
agency can hold back payment (on the basis of the Attorney General's opinion) in
which case the aggrieved contractor can still appeal the adverse board decision to
the Court of Claims.
In the instant case, the Air Force has chosen the third alternative, and Southside
has appealed to the Court of Claims. Evidently, a set off against Southside was unavailable. The first alternative was rejected because the Air Force was reluctant to
appeal the adverse GAO determination. There is no distinction between the GAO's
disallowance of a board-approved claim and its allowance of a board-denied claim,
so far as the government's right to protect its interests through judicial review is
concerned. The Attorney General's conclusion that the GAO's right to allow boarddenied claims cannot be derived from its claims settlement authority cannot stand
when it rests on this fictitious distinction of loss of right to appeal. Even if this distinction were valid, the Attorney General's later recommendation that the government's
policy against appeal of adverse decisions should be abandoned, would render this
argument worthless.
Government Appeal of Adverse Board Decisions
The current policy against government appeal of adverse board decisions dates from
before the Wunderlich Act. This policy is based upon an equitable theory under
which a party to a contract who secures thereunder the privilege of settling any disputes arising out of that agreement ought to be bound by its own determination in
the dispute. As government contract disputes procedures were improved and expanded, two conflicting viewpoints arose. One view, in line with the above theory, was
that if either party could appeal, this would destroy the finality of the board decision
with the result that (1) the contractor's inability to rely on the board decision would
53. See cases cited in note 50 supra.
54. Panel Presentation by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Martin Richman,
A.B.A. National Institute, Mechanics of Sale and Dispute: Facets of the Law of Public
Contracts, March 22, 1969. The Attorney General's opinion merely stated that payment
followed by suit to recover would be an acceptable procedure in order to avoid delay
in payment to the contractor who has been successful at the administrative level.
Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 21-22.
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create confusion in his relationships with subcontractors, sureties, and banks; and (2)
the usefulness of the complex disputes machinery would be severely limited, perhaps
55
to the point of being economically unfeasible.
Commissioner Spector of the Court of Claims finds support for this view in the
Wunderlich Act. In a recent report to the Court of Claims, Commissioner Spector
noted with surprise the last sentence of the Appeals Board decision to the effect that:
"[t]his decision is returned to the Court of Claims for judicial review in accordance
56
with the Court's Order." The Commissioner stated that:
In addition to the fact that there is nothing in the court's order . . . requiring return of the Board's decision . . . for judicial review, it is virtually
unprecedented for an agency to in effect disavow its own decision, or to seek
judicial confirmation or reassurance....
If a contracting officer or board were disposed to disavow, or impeach, or
challenge the validity of his or its own decision on the ground, as in this case,
that it failed to meet Wunderlich Act standards, that contracting officer or
board would quite naturally not find for the contractor in the first instance....
Nor does the [agency] defendant's counsel [the Attorney General] stand in a
different position than defendant in this regard. He is not empowered to create
a dispute, as he does in effect when he assumes the burden of proving that
both parties to the dispute, including his own party, are wrong. This is a
heavy burden indeed. Nowhere in the standard "Disputes" clause, nor in the
regulations establishing the contract appeals board, nor in the Wunderlich
Act, nor in its legislative history, is anyone other than the head of the department or his representative mentioned as a decision-making authority....
It is further apparent from that history that the [Wunderlich] act was
designed to reopen an avenue of judicial relief to aggrieved contractors.
There is not a scintilla of evidence in that history to suggest that the Act was
intended to provide a means for an agency (or its5 7counsel) to test its own decision favoring the contractor. [Emphasis added.]
The second viewpoint, which favors government appeal of adverse board decisions,
stresses that the boards have become so impartial and detached from the agencies
they represent, that the "agency" would not, in fact, be appealing its own decision. The main argument is that "[t]he settling of claims cannot be a one way
5
street and Congress obviously intended no such result." 8 Both former Attorney
General Clark and Comptroller General Staats agree on this view: "It is clear . . .
55. Panel Presentation by Louis Spector, Commissioner, U.S. Court of Claims,
A.B.A. National Institute, Mechanics of Sale and Dispute: Facets of the Law of
Public Contracts, March 22, 1969. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 135. "[I]t is arguable
that the contractor should be entitled to an appeal to a disinterested board and a final
decision which cannot be upset by another government agency. While the GAO is not
a party to the contract, it is part of the government and it seems unjust that it should
refuse to recognize the bargain the government has struck which includes a finalit
clause placing serious limitations on the contractor's basic rights and remedies." Id. at
133.
56. Report of the Commissioner to the Court on J. L. Simmons, Co. v. United States,
Court of Claims No. 186-59, Jan. 21, 1969, at 42.
57. Id. at 42-44.
58. Brief, supra note 10, at 11.
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from the legislative history of the Wunderlich Act . . . that Congress intended board
decisions to be no more conclusive against the Government than against a contractor." 5 9
A subcommittee of the section of Public Contract Law of the American Bar Association has also taken this view. It has recently proposed the formation of a single
federal board of contract appeals modelled on a regular court system, with sections
in each of the federal circuits. 60 With complete trial jurisdiction over all public contract disputes, the unified board would take claims settlement authority away from
the head of the department, 61 and allow the government as well as the contractor a
full right of appeal to an entity distinct from the agency.
Assuming that Congress actually did intend that the disputes clause procedures
should not be a one-way street, there being no evidence to the contrary, the question
remains who, within or without the contracting agency, is best suited to determine
whether judicial review of an adverse case is warranted. The Attorney General feels
that the responsibility for forcing court review is part of the executive responsibility
for administering and enforcing government contracts:
The contracting agencies should call to [the Justice] Department's attention,
on a continuing basis, appeals board decisions against the Government which
they feel warrant litigation in accordance with the Wunderlich Act.
Thereupon, as when a contractor initiates judicial review of a board decision
in favor of the Government, [the Justice] Department . . . will make an

independent appraisal as to whether the suit can properly be litigated under
the Wunderlich Act.

62

The GAO substantially agreed with the Attorney General. The Comptroller
General believed, however, that the Justice Department should not get involved in
claims settlement until payment to the conractor has been made, and the decision
has been made by the agency to sue to recover the erroneous payment.
The Attorney General noted that the GAO has in the past assured some check on
the performance of the boards through its audit of board approved claims, but that
the agencies should not allow this check to be an excuse for shirking their duty to
represent the government's interests. The problem here is who, within the agency,
should be empowered to make the initial decision as to whether the adverse board
decision should be appealed. Although the contracting and legal officials of the
agency have the most intimate familiarity with the cases, at the same time they
would be likely to uphold the board decision, unless specifically delegated the task of
59. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 20.
60. Robert Moss, Chairman of the Subcommittee to Propose Public Contract Procedures, Committee on Disputes and Judicial Remedies of the A.B.A. Section of Public
Contract Law, presented the proposal to committee members in a letter of March 17,
1969. The plan, entitled Comprehensive Unified System of Determining Contractor and
Government Rights and Remedies, was presented for debate at the A.B.A. National
Institute, Mechanics of Sale and Dispute: Facets of the Law of Public Contracts,
March 22, 1969.
61. This would dispel the myth of United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S.
709 (1963) and United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966),
that the board is the "alter ego" of the agency. Although the department heads
theoretically do have the final say, they rarely question board decisions.
62. Attorney General Clark's letter, supra note 7, at 19.
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review with some detachment from agency policies and personalities. Both the Attorney General and the GAO agreed that affirmative procedures should be established
within the executive agencies for determining whether it is in the government's best
interest to appeal adverse board decisions. A statutory procedure would be helpful,
but the agencies are advised (1) to "reconsider" their practice of accepting adverse
administrative determinations as final, and (2) to modify their regulations to effect
that change in policy, rather than wait for the slow voice of Congress.
The Legal Effect of the Attorney General's Opinion
The Attorney General justifies his jurisdiction to render an opinion in the Southside
dispute upon opinions of his predecessors which hold that fundamental questions
involving legal relationships between government agencies require resolution by him
63
to the extent that no one agency is empowered to decide such questions.
The Attorney General is authorized by law to issue opinions upon request by the
President (and, presumably, executive department heads),64 but the statute is silent
as to the legal effect of such opinions on the departments involved. The instant case
involves not only a GAO payment which is final as against the Air Force under the
GAO's authority, but also an exercise of discretion by the Air Force pursuant to an
executive function independently confided to it, i.e., administration and enforcement
of defense contracts. The Attorney General asserts that this matter is therefore within
the unique competence of the government's counsel, and that his opinion is binding on
all agencies concerned.
The Comptroller General has historically refused to be bound by the opinions of
the Attorney General, and has disregarded them whenever they have conflicted with
his view of the legality of the agency's action. 63 Comptroller General Staats has indicated that his office will continue to review contract appeals board decisions adverse
to the contractor, in defiance of the former Attorney General's opinion. 66 It is likely,
however, that executive agencies will consider themselves less bound by GAO reversals of such decisions in the future, and that aggrieved contractors, predicting
noncompliance by the agencies in cases necessitating a "remand" on a question of
fact, will tend to bypass the otherwise shorter, less expensive GAO appeal and sue
directly in the Court of Claims.
The Attorney General's opinion will therefore have some practical effect, whether
it is right or wrong. Legally, however, the opinion cannot prevent the GAO from
pursuing a practice which the Attorney General declares illegal and unwise. The
only remedy possible for the Attorney General is an act of Congress either defining
the grounds for and the effect of his opinions on the agencies concerned, or, in the
instant case, clearly setting out the role and procedures of the GAO in government
contract disputes settlement.
63. See, e.g., 33 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 383, 385 (1922); 26 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 81, 87
(1906) ; 25 Op. ATT'y GEN. 301, 304 (1904).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 303 (1964).
65. Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power to
Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, supra note 14, at 353.
66. Letter from Comptroller General Staats to Attorney General Mitchell, Feb. 7,
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Conclusions
Until such time as the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 is either modified or
expanded by Congress to specify the procedures available to the GAO in claims
settlement, the GAO is legally authorized to bind executive agencies by its review of
contract appeals board decisions both for and against the government. This authority
to review is subject to board determinations on questions of fact which conform
to the standards of the Wunderlich Act, and to questions of fact (such as the amount
of the equitable adjustment in the Southside case) which have not been resolved by
the board prior to the GAO's consideration of the case, and to any other problems
in the GAO's resolution of the claim which might necessitate further action by the
agency. There are several practical or policy reasons why the GAO should not have
this far-reaching power, notably that the GAO's power to disallow exerts a disruptive
influence on the programs and policies of the executive agencies. These reasons have
no grounding in statute, however, and until Congress acts definitively on the matter,
the rule of practice will continue to put a premium on agency ambitions.
It is desirable that a government contract disputes procedure be adopted that allows
both parties to the contract the same right to obtain judicial review of any settlement
pursuant to the contract's terms, which they could obtain if both parties were private
citizens. There should be some disinterested person or group within each agency,
familiar with its regulations and practices, whose duty it is to review that agency's
adverse board decisions to determine initially whether appeal to the courts is in the
best interest of the government. If it is determined that such a case may warrant
further action the claim should be paid and the case sent on to the Justice Department for consideration of the feasibility of suit to recover payment. Withholding payment to force the contractor to sue to enforce his favorable administrative determination would impose on him an unjust burden; a delay in payment might make it
impossible for him to continue performance of the contract, and might even force
him out of business.
If this system cannot work without effecting chaos in the contractor's business relationships, or without rendering the contract appeals boards relatively useless, then
a new system of disputes settlement should be adopted which is distinct from the
agencies, and which would serve as a deterrent to unnecessary appeals. It has been
suggested that the number of contract appeals boards be reduced to two, one for
civilian and one for military agencies. 67 A more radical, but perhaps more practical,
suggestion is the recent proposal by the American Bar Association subcommittee of
68
a special court system for the adjudication of all public contract disputes.
An opinion issued by the Attorney General in his capacity of counsel to the government carries no legal weight, and has only as much effect in practice as the agencies
involved are willing to give it. It is essentially the advice of an attorney to his client.
If the opinions of the Attorney General are to be conclusive on any branch of the
government, affirmative action by Congress will be necessary.
67. Frana, Are There Too Many Boards of Contract Appeals? 17 CATHOLIC U.L.
REv. 44 (1967).
68. See text at note 60 supra.

